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Abstract  
This paper offers a brief exploration of conceptual issues around ‘skills’ and its derivatives.  It offers 
some theoretical background and it invites consideration of Design and Technology as a ‘learning 
agency’.  The core argument is that critiquing skills are necessary skills for the field and that the term 
‘critiquing skills’ can be considered in four ways.  There is much to be researched around the genre of 
skills in Design and Technology and the paper also suggests four curriculum considerations: the 
politics of skilling; the ontologies of skilling; the temporalities of skilling; and, education of, for, and 
through skilling.  The aim of the paper is to help see the notion of ‘skills for the 21st Century’ as 
problematic for education. 
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Orientations 
After the toddling-age we walk on pavements without minding our steps.  But a mountaineer 
walking over ice-covered rocks in a high wind in the dark does not move (his) limbs by blind 
habit; he thinks what he is doing, he is ready for emergencies, he economises in effort, he makes 
tests and experiments; in short he walks with some degree of skill and judgement.  If he makes a 
mistake he is inclined not to repeat it, and if he finds a new trick effective he is inclined to use it 
and to improve on it.  He is concomitantly walking and teaching himself how to walk in 
conditions of this sort.  It is of the essence of merely habitual practices that one performance is a 
replica of its predecessors.  It is of the essence of intelligent practices that one performance is 
modified by its predecessors.  The agent is still learning.’  (Ryle, 1949/1973:42.  My italics) 
 
Skill is intensive and refined world engagement.  Skill, in turn, is bound up with social 
engagement.  It molds the person and gives the person character.  (He cites Sturt’s excellent 
1923 chronicle: The Wheelwright’s Shop) (Borgmann, 1984/2004:116.  Comment added.) 
 
Throughout history, at least in the Western world, the project of technology has been to capture 
the skills of the craftsman or artisan, and to reconfigure their practice as the application of 
rational principles the specification of which has no regard for human experience and 
sensibility. (Ingold, 2006:78) 
 
 
Skills – sketching the background  
If ever there was a term to excite epistemological discussion it could be ‘skill’.  Skill resists fine 
definition or being positioned in any particular knowledge camp.  When Ryle (1949/1973:17) set 
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about challenging ‘…with deliberate abusiveness…’ what he called ”the Ghost in the Machine” 
(Decartes’ hugely influential separation of ‘mind’ and ‘body’) he contributed helpfully to Design and 
Technology’s (D&T’s) own deliberations.  This paper offers a brief exploration of conceptual issues 
around ‘skill-skills-skilling’; examines some associated contextual considerations; invites 
consideration of D&T as a ‘learning agency’; and; suggests that critiquing skills are necessary skills 
for the field and that they might be considered in four ways. 
 
Ryle distinguished between ‘knowing that’ (sometimes: propositional or declarative knowledge of the 
‘fact’-type) and ‘knowing how’ (procedural knowledge).  Mitcham (1994) explores the idea of 
technology-as-knowledge and offers a spectrum of distinctions.  The ‘least conceptual’ of these is 
sensorimotor skill.  For him, such skills ‘…of making and using are preconscious “knowhow” more 
than “know that”, acquired by intuitive as well as trial and error learning or imitative 
apprenticeship…and thus do not qualify as knowledge in the strict sense.’ (Mitcham, 1994:193).  
However, he also reports how phenomenologists such as Dreyfus (below) see skills as cognitive 
development and that, in the domain of skill: ‘…there is no transformation, even at the level of 
expertise, to abstract or formal and therefore conceptually teachable knowledge.’ (Mitcham, 
1994:196). 
 
The nature of skill-knowledge is differently articulated by Polanyi’s (1958/1974; 1966/2009) work on 
tacit knowledge – that which we have but which we can neither show nor accurately describe.  This 
includes ‘…the performance of skills, whether artistic, athletic, or technical.  We have here examples 
of knowing, both of a more intellectual and more practical kind; both the “wissen” and ”können” of 
the Germans, or the “knowing what” (sic) and the “knowing how” of Gilbert Ryle.  These two aspects 
of knowing have a similar structure and neither is ever present without the other.’ (Polanyi, 
1966/2009:6-7).  Polanyi (1958/1974:54) has also differentiated between skill (as the art of doing) and 
connoisseurship (as the art of knowing) – both of which, he contends, are transmissible.   
 
Collins & Evans (2007/2009) expand a tacit knowledge thesis and present their ‘periodic table of 
expertises’.  They describe what they call ‘ubiquitous expertises’, that is: ‘…all the endlessly 
indescribable skills it takes to live in a human society; these were once thought of as trivial 
accomplishments.’ (Collins & Evans. 2007/2009:16)   This distinction is helpful when considering the 
multiplicity of skills development expected of education. 
 
Ryle argued skills to be ‘acquired dispositions’ or intelligent capacities and he distinguishes them 
from habits.  Someone doing something by blind habit does so ‘…automatically and without having in 
mind what he (sic) is doing.  He does not exercise care, vigilance, or criticism’. (Ryle, 1949/1973:41).  
More recently, Sennett (2008) offers a general understanding that ‘skill is a trained practice’ – which 
he contrasts with sudden inspiration.  He notes that as skills develop, the content of what is practised 
changes.  This fits with the notion of skills as tacit knowledge as that which is tacit grows and, in 
several senses, develops.  It is not simply a fixed form of knowledge to be taken on board by the 
learner.  Sennett further points to the role of skill development happening as more, and increasingly 
difficult, problem situations are encountered.  ‘The open relation between problem solving and 
problem finding, as in Linux work, builds and expands skills, but this can’t be a one-off event.  Skill 
opens up in this way only because the rhythm of solving and opening occurs again and again.’ Sennett 
(2008:38) 
 
Ingold (1993/1994b) distinguishes amongst technology, technics and technique and the last of these 
refer to ‘…skills, regarded as the embodied capabilities of particular human subjects…’ and he 
reminds us (citing Mauss) that ‘…it is a fundamental mistake to think that “there is technique only 
where there is an instrument”’. (Ingold, 1993/1994b:433).  Meanwhile Mitcham (1994:197) reports 
Bunge’s distinction between technical practice (engineering, medicine, etc) and technics (artisanal 
craft skills). 
 
As with most scholars, Ingold resists the idea that skill might be considered the application of 
knowledge because ‘…acting in the world is the skilled practitioner’s way of knowing it.  The 
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perceptual knowledge so gained is…an integral part of personal identity.  Hence, in the constitution of 
their environments, agents reciprocally constitute themselves as persons.’ (Ingold, 1993/1994b:443)  It 
is in such statements that the important ontological dimension of skills and skilling begins to present 
itself.  The work of Dreyfus on Heidegger is very helpful here. 
 
As Dreyfus reports, Heidegger moved away from an epistemological approach to argue an ontological 
one.  No matter one’s take on how we think we ‘know’ this or that about the world, Heidegger brings 
matters down to the ontological, that how we make sense of things amounts to how we are in the 
world.  ‘Thus Heidegger breaks with Husserl and the Cartesian tradition by substituting for 
epistemological questions concerning the relation of the knower and the known, ontological questions 
concerning what sorts of beings we are and how our being is bound up with the intelligibility of the 
world.’ (Dreyfus, 1991:3)  Heidegger, Dreyfus reports, seeks to reverse Decartes conclusion from “I 
think therefore I am” to “I am therefore I think”.   
 
For D&T education, Heidegger has led the way on showing how our very being is technological – 
whether through the skilful use of technologies; our adoption of them; our intimate relations with 
them; or for how they shape our futures.  Importantly, he has said that ‘…the essence of technology is 
by no means anything technological’ (Heidegger, 1954/1977:4) reminding us that neat dictionary 
definitions or common stereotypes about the nature of technology are simply inadequate for our 
proper understanding of the phenomenon.  Existential discourse offers invaluable critique of how we 
understand ‘skill’.  Consider, for example, this statement: ‘…our understanding of our being is never 
fully accessible since (1) it is embodied in skills and (2) we dwell in our understanding like fish in 
water.’ (Dreyfus, 1991:35) 
 
Dreyfus reports that Polanyi, Kuhn and Heidegger alike consider inadequate the view held for 2500 
years that there exists ‘theoretical, disinterested knowledge’.  They argue that such knowledge actually 
‘…presupposes a practical and involved “know-how” that cannot be accounted for in terms of 
theoretical knowledge.  According to these thinkers, theoretical knowledge depends on practical 
skills.’ (Dreyfus, 1991:46) 
 
Dreyfus also discusses the inconclusive discourse around Leibniz’s view that skills amount to theories 
we are not yet clear about.  (D&T can be well articulated via the playfully ambiguous ‘knowledge-in-
the-making’.)  To this end he cites, first, Habermas’s claim that in goal-directed actions such as skills 
‘…an implicit knowledge is expressed; this know-how can in principle also be transformed into a 
know-that’ and then, Papert’s claim that ‘…even physical skills such as bike-riding and juggling are 
performed by following theories.’ (Dreyfus, 1991:86).  Such cognitivist positions are countered, 
Dreyfus argues, by Heidegger’s claim that ‘…when we carefully describe everyday ongoing coping 
activity we do not find any mental states’.  That is, in our everyday lives we operate skilfully and 
without conscious acknowledgment of any operational theory or thought process.  This has its parallel 
in the learning of a skill when it might be said that someone is skilful when they no longer have to 
think about what they are doing.  ‘The novice becomes skilled not through the acquisition of rules and 
representations, but at the point where he or she is able to dispense with them.’ (Ingold, 
1993/1994a:462)  Thus we consider the reflective feedback engaged when skilful practice encounters 
new challenges for which the skill is suited but which is in need of considered application (the 
thoughtful mountaineer’s footwork perhaps).  Schön’s (1983) work on ‘reflection-in-action’ resonates 
here too. 
 
The genre of skills 
Having some understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of ‘skill’ and its derivative terms is 
essential but their application demands perspective too.  Habermas (1971) offers a practical 
philosophy informed by critical theory that invites us to be mindful of whose, and what kind of, 
knowledge interests are being served when we consider what it means to be skilled (or otherwise).  In 
outline, he proposes we consider: i) the technical where knowledge remains at the instrumental or 
functional level; ii) the practical-hermeneutic that facilitates capacities to operate in and understand 
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the world; and iii) the critical-emancipatory that facilitates personal autonomy, fulfilment and critical-
participatory being-in-the-world.   
 
A ready starting point is the ‘skills agenda’ so evident in current political-economic ideology (for it is 
more than just policy) in many countries.  A major question for the politics of education is whether 
education be led by the needs of industry and business.  Claims that students should be ‘work-ready’ 
or need to be trained (sic) to meet skills shortages are all indicators of a particular politics of 
education.  A different politics might, for example, privilege education over training; the democratic 
and social good over industry and business; or, the environment over ‘the market’. 
 
Helpfully, one methodology of the Habermasian approach is ideology critique which seeks to 
interrogate the values, beliefs and practices of particular dominant groups.  A prime candidate is the 
current neo-liberal economic ideology of aggressive capitalism while simultaneously demanding 
skills-as-needed and multiple forms of de-skilling: de-skilling ourselves by accepting ‘automated’ and 
‘smart’ technologies into our lives; deskilling or displacing craftspeople; deskilling professions such 
as teachers by dictating curricula, assessments and pedagogies; and, deskilling participatory 
citizenship both by stifling debate and dissent, and by leaving technological decision-making to elites 
of experts (Sclove, 1995;  Feenberg, 2010).   
 
We might accept that it is useful to several parties to ‘be skilled’ but when we consider de-skilling, re-
skilling, up-skilling; being unskilled; soft skills; hard skills; and more, it might be worth asking whose 
interests are being served.  Further, there is the ill-distribution of skills or the control of the associated 
knowledge and practices  whether historically by guilds, by apprenticeship models, by labour and 
market control mechanisms, or by discrimination.  The more one looks the clearer it becomes that 
‘skill’ can be a multifaceted and multi-located concept.  We might further consider: 
 
Gender politics and skills…  ‘How has it come about that women have failed to achieve recognition of 
the skills required by their work?  …Definitions of skill can have more to do with ideological and 
social constructions than with technical competencies...’ (Wajcman, 1991:37; see also Haraway, 1991; 
Cockburn, 1999; Wajcman, 2004) 
 
Levels of skilling, and for who’s good…?  One’s capacities and power are informed by skill levels.  
‘Limitations of skill confine any one person’s primary engagement with the world to a small area’ 
Borgmann (1984/2004:116).  As with any form of education, if people’s skilling is limited then 
individuals and society alike are the poorer as a result.  Sennett writes of ‘antisocial expertise’ as 
‘…an inherent inequality of knowledge between expert and nonexpert’ as opposed to ‘sociable 
expertise’ which serves the common good  (Sennett, 2008:248-249).  Sennett (2008:52) also 
articulates a common concern around skill marginalisation by new technologies.  ‘When the head and 
the hand are separated, the result is mental impairment – an outcome particularly evident when a 
technology like CAD is used to efface the learning that occurs through drawing by hand.’  (For a 
parallel D&T discussion, see McLaren, 2008) 
 
Skill-suppression by association…   Greenhalgh (1997) shows how, over the twentieth Century, ‘craft’ 
(and associated skills) has been positioned negatively against ‘progress’ and ‘industrial culture’.  ‘To a 
considerable extent, craft has been seen as the cultural Luddism of our times…  Consequently, in an 
age of mass communications and technology-driven positivism, it has been portrayed as a reactionary 
force and accordingly marginalised.’ (Greenhalgh, 1997:104) 
 
Skills as personal re-invention…  Ingold (2006) discusses the fate of skill and points to the ever-
reinvention of skills – that as soon as humans endeavour to adapt skills and techniques into machines 
and computers, people have a fascinating habit of developing new skills with the new devices: ‘…the 
essence of skill has come to lie in the improvisational ability of practitioners to disassemble the 
constructions of technology, and creatively to incorporate the pieces into their own walks of life.’ 
(Ingold, 2006:79)  
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This brief section has given a flavour of the complexity and richness of what might be called the genre 
of skills.  I’d argue that the term ‘skill’ and its derivatives are too lightly, and uncritically, used within, 
or about, our field.  The term is problematic and should be treated problematically by educators.  
There is much to be research around the genre of skills and D&T and this investigation suggests four 
D&T curriculum considerations: the politics of skilling; the ontologies of skilling; the temporalities of 
skilling; and, education of, for, and through skilling. 
 
 
Design and Technology as learning agency 
The title of this paper was inspired by Ryle’s (1949/1973) distinction between ‘habitual practices’ 
(agent as replicator) and ‘intelligent practices’ (agent as learner).  I suggest that D&T could be 
considered as a learning agency, that is, as a site of intelligent practices, as a site for knowledge-in-the-
making.  Such an agency might be informed by the following notional criteria (noting that these are 
addressed to general education – the years of compulsory schooling for all children): 
 
Contributing to an education where: 
• all the ‘agents’: teachers, administrators, and pupils alike,  are co-learners (Boomer, 
1989/1999); 
• the educational fulfilment of children is privileged over materialist outcomes; 
• democratic and sustainable futures are privileged over unsustainable socially and 
environmentally harmful economic ends (Keirl, 2015a); 
• critical-constructivist pedagogies are the norm; and, 
• initiation (Peters, 1966), training, enculturation and indoctrination are each understood for 
what they are. 
 
Within the above, D&T as learning agency: 
• works to advance ethical-critical technological and design literacies (Keirl, 2015b); 
• is celebrated as a ‘doing’ field, design-rich, critical in nature, and ethically-focussed; 
• is resistant to, and critical of, divisions of the academic-vocational kind and is actively 
resistant to gendered and class-based division; 
• practises rich and critical design-oriented pedagogies rather than those of narrow 
instrumentalism (Freire 1972, Keirl, 2016); 
• is resistant to prescriptive content-dependent curriculum and celebrates the interplay of 
knowing how and knowing that through critical-constructivist pedagogy; 
• initiates learners into a multiplicity of skills rather than an educationally restrictive few; and, 
• uses assessment as a personal learning support for each agent and not as an instrument of 
classification. 
 
Within the above, skilling: 
• is understood richly as a combined ontological, epistemological and social good.  ‘The 
practice of skills is inventive; by concentrating our purpose on the achievement of success we 
evoke ever new capacities in ourselves.’ (Polanyi, 1962/1974:128); 
• is much more than learning ‘how to’.  Ingold (1993/1994a:462) cites Lave’s (1990) distinction 
between ‘understanding in practice’ and ‘the culture of acquisition’.  He also distinguishes 
between ‘enculturation’ (into that which already exists) and ’…enskillment, in which learning 
is inseparable from doing, and in which both are embedded in the context of practical 
engagement in the world – that is, in dwelling.’ (Ingold, 1993/1994a:463); 
• advances all three Habermasian knowledge interests: and, 
• develops ‘intelligent capacities’ which ‘…involves the stimulation by criticism and example 
of the pupil’s own judgement.’ (Ryle, 1949/1973:42) 
 
 
The fourfold of ‘critiquing skills’ 
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It is argued that talk of ‘skills for the 21st Century’ warrants interrogation.  Thus, it is also argued that 
‘D&T as learning agency’, along with the associated notional criteria set out above, calls for practices 
of criticism, critique, critical thinking, critical reflection (Schön, 1983), and more.  (On the emergence 
of these in D&T, see Williams & Stables, 2016).  Thus, the phrase critiquing skills might have four 
senses: 
1. skills of critiquing at the meta or philosophical level.  Here, critical thinking and critical 
discourse are practised as philosophical method.  Skills of critiquing serve to interrogate 
philosophical arguments, positions and claims;  
2. (applying 1, above) critiquing ‘skills’, that is, interrogating critically the very concept of 
‘skill’ and its derivatives. Questioning meanings, purposes, interests, benefits, and limitations;  
3. skills of critiquing in the micro and meso levels of practices of D&T learning.  Here, 
critiquing plays multiple roles in enhancing technological and design literacies (Keirl, 2016); 
and, 
4. skills of critiquing as a component of general education serving all learning agents to the 
benefit of a common good.  Here, the practice of critiquing serves the wellbeing of democracy 
by enhancing discourses and debate while challenging passivity and blind acceptance of 
unworthy ways of being-in-the-world. 
 
‘Skill’ and its derivatives are commonly linked to our field but responsible Design and Technology 
education must consider, in many ways, for all its learners, a suite of critically ‘intelligent practices’ 
for its own skilful being-in-the-world.   
 
 
References  
Boomer, G., (1989/1999), ‘Education and the Media – Makers or Mirrors? Dilemmas in the 
development of Australian culture’ in (Ed.) Green, B., (1999), Designs on Learning: Essays on 
curriculum and teaching by Garth Boomer, pp. 71-81, Australian Curriculum Studies Association, 
Canberra. 
 
Borgmann, A., (1984/2004), ‘Focal Things and Practices,’ in Kaplan, D. M., (Ed.), (2004), Readings 
in the Philosophy of Technology, pp115-136, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham. 
 
Cockburn, C., (1999), ‘The material of male power’ in (Eds.), MacKenzie, D. & Wajcman, J., (1999), 
The Social Shaping of Technology, 2nd Edition, pp 177-198, Open University Press, Buckingham. 
 
Collins, H. & Evans, R., (2007/2009), Rethinking Expertise, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
 
Dreyfus, H.L., (1991), Being-in-the-World A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time – Division 
1, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
Feenberg, A., (2010), Between Reason and Experience and Experience: Essays in Modernity and 
Technology, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Freire, P., (1972), Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Penguin, London 
 
Greenhalgh, P., (1997) ‘The Progress of Captain Ludd’ in Dormer, P., (Ed.), (1997), The Culture of 
Craft: Status and future, pp. 104-115, Manchester University Press, Manchester. 
 
Habermas, J., (1971), Knowledge and Human Interests, Beacon, Boston. 
 
Haraway, D., (1991) ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late 
Twentieth Century,’ in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, (1991, pp149-181), 
New York, Routledge. 
 
 7 
Heidegger, M., (1954/1977), The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, (trans. Lovitt, 
W.), Harper & Row, N.Y.  
 
Ingold, T., (1993/1994a), ‘Technology, language, intelligence: A reconsideration of basic concepts’ in 
Gibson, K. R. & Ingold, T., (Eds.), (1993/1994), Tools, Language, and Cognition in Human 
Evolution, pp. 449-472, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Ingold, T., (1993/1994b), ‘Tool use, sociality and intelligence’ in Gibson, K. R. & Ingold, T., (Eds.), 
(1993/1994), Tools, Language, and Cognition in Human Evolution, pp. 429-445, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Ingold, T., (2006), ‘Walking the Plank: Meditations on a process of skill’ in (Ed.) Dakers, J.R., (2006), 
Defining Technological Literacy: Towards an epistemological framework, pp. 65-80, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
 
Keirl, S., (2015a), ‘Against Neoliberalism; For Sustainable-Democratic curriculum; Through Design 
and Technology Education’, in Stables, K. & Keirl, S., (Eds.), (2015), Environment, Ethics and 
Cultures: Design and Technology Education’s Contribution to Sustainable Global Futures, pp, 153-
174, Sense, Rotterdam. 
 
Keirl, S., (2015b), ‘Global ethics, sustainability, and Design and Technology Education’, in Stables, 
K. & Keirl, S., (Eds.), (2015), Environment, Ethics and Cultures: Design and Technology Education’s 
Contribution to Sustainable Global Futures, pp. 33-52, Sense, Rotterdam. 
 
Keirl, S., (2016 Forthcoming), ‘Critiquing as Design and Technology curriculum journey: history, 
theory, politics, and potential’ in Williams, J. & Stables, K., (Eds.), (2016 Forthcoming), Critique in 
Technology Education, Springer, Dordrecht  
 
McLaren, S., (2008), ‘Exploring perceptions and attitudes towards teaching and learning manual 
technical drawing in a digital age’, International Journal of Technology and Design Education. 
18:2:167-188  
 
Mitcham, C., (1994), Thinking Through Technology: The Path between Engineering and Philosophy, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Peters, R.S., (1966), Ethics and Education, George Allen & Unwin, London 
 
Polanyi, M., (1958/1974), Personal Knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Polanyi, M., (1966/2009), The Tacit Dimension, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Ryle, G., (1949/1973), The Concept of Mind, Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
 
Schön, D. A., (1983) The Reflective Practitioner: How professionals think in action, Jossey-Bass, San 
Francisco, CA. 
 
Sclove, R.E., (1995), Democracy and Technology, The Guilford Press, N.Y. 
 
Sennett, R., (2008), The Craftsman, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
 
Sturt, G., (1923/1993), The Wheelwright’s Shop, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Wajcman, J., (1991), Feminism Confronts Technology, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
 
 8 
Wajcman, J., (2004), TechnoFeminism, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
 
Williams, J. & Stables, K., (Eds.), (2016 Forthcoming), Critique in Technology Education, Springer, 
Dordrecht 
